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Abstract
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive
an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compat-
ibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret, we are able
to adapt statistical machine learning techniques to the design of payment rules. This
computational approach to mechanism design is applicable to domains with multi-
dimensional types and situations where computational efficiency is a concern. Specifi-
cally, given an outcome rule and access to a type distribution, we train a support vector
machine with a special discriminant function structure such that it implicitly estab-
lishes a payment rule with desirable incentive properties. We discuss applications to
a multi-minded combinatorial auction with a greedy winner-determination algorithm
and to an assignment problem with egalitarian outcome rule. Experimental results
demonstrate both that the construction produces payment rules with low ex post re-
gret, and that penalizing classification errors is effective in preventing failures of ex
post individual rationality.
1 Introduction
Mechanism design studies situations where a set of agents each hold private information
about their preferences over different outcomes. The designer chooses a center that receives
claims about such preferences, selects and enforces an outcome, and optionally collects
payments. The classical approach is to impose incentive compatibility, ensuring that agents
truthfully report their preferences in strategic equilibrium. Subject to this constraint, the
goal is to identify a mechanism, i.e., a way of choosing an outcome and payments based
on agents’ reports, that optimizes a given design objective like social welfare, revenue, or
some notion of fairness.
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There are, however, significant challenges associated with this classical approach. First
of all, it can be analytically cumbersome to derive optimal mechanisms for domains that
are “multi-dimensional” in the sense that each agent’s private information is described
through more than a single number, and few results are known in this case.1 Second,
incentive compatibility can be costly, in that adopting it as a hard constraint can preclude
mechanisms with useful economic properties. For example, imposing the strongest form of
incentive compatibility, truthfulness in a dominant strategy equilibrium or strategyproof-
ness, necessarily leads to poor revenue, vulnerability to collusion, and vulnerability to
false-name bidding in combinatorial auctions where valuations exhibit complementarities
among items [2, 21]. A third difficulty occurs when the optimal mechanism has an outcome
or payment rule that is computationally intractable.
In the face of these difficulties, we adopt statistical machine learning to automatically
infer mechanisms with good incentive properties. Rather than imposing incentive compat-
ibility as a hard constraint, we start from a given outcome rule and use machine learning
techniques to identify a payment rule that minimizes agents’ expected ex post regret relative
to this outcome rule. Here, the ex post regret an agent has for truthful reporting in a given
instance is the amount by which its utility could be increased through a misreport. While
a mechanism with zero ex post regret for all inputs is obviously strategyproof, we are not
aware of any additional direct implication in terms of equilibrium properties.2 Support for
expected ex post regret as a quantifiable target for mechanism design rather comes from
a simple model of manipulation where agents face a certain cost for strategic behavior. If
this cost is higher than the expected gain, agents can be assumed to behave truthfully.
We do insist on mechanisms in which the price to an agent, conditioned on an outcome, is
independent of its report. This provides additional robustness against manipulation in the
sense that there is no local price sensitivity.3
Our approach is applicable to domains that are multi-dimensional or for which the com-
putational efficiency of outcome rules is a concern. Given the implied relaxation of incentive
1One example of a multi-dimensional domain is a combinatorial auction, where an agent’s preferences
are described by a numerical value for each of several different bundles of items.
2The expected ex post regret given a distribution over types provides an upper bound on the expected
regret of an agent who knows its own type but has only distributional information on the types of other
agents. The latter metric is also appealing, but does not seem to fit well with the generalization error of
statistical machine learning. An emerging literature is developing various regret-based metrics for quan-
tifying the incentive properties of mechanisms [19, 7, 17, 5], and there also exists experimental support
for a quantifiable measure of the divergence between the distribution on payoffs in a mechanism and that
in a strategyproof reference mechanism like the VCG mechanism [18]. An earlier literature had looked
for approximate incentive compatibility or incentive compatibility in the large-market limit, see, e.g., the
recent survey by Carroll [5]. Related to the general theme of relaxing incentive compatibility is work of
Pathak and So¨nmez [20] that provides a qualitative ranking of different mechanisms in terms of the number
of manipulable instances, and work of Budish [3] that introduces an asymptotic, binary, design criterion
regarding incentive properties in a large replica economy limit. Whereas the present work is constructive,
the latter seek to explain which mechanisms are adopted in practice.
3Erdil and Klemperer [8] consider a metric that emphasizes this property.
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compatibility, the intended application is to domains in which incentive compatibility is
unavailable or undesirable for outcome rules that meet certain economic and computational
desiderata. The payment rule is learned on the basis of a given outcome rule, and as such
the framework is most meaningful in domains where revenue considerations are secondary
to outcome considerations.
The essential insight is that the payment rule of a strategyproof mechanism can be
thought of as a classifier for predicting the outcome: the payment rule implies a price to
each agent for each outcome, and the selected outcome must be one that simultaneously
maximizes reported value minus price for every agent. By limiting classifiers to discriminant
functions4 with this “value-minus-price” structure, where the price can be an arbitrary
function of the outcome and the reports of other agents, we obtain a remarkably direct
connection between multi-class classification and mechanism design. For an appropriate
loss function, the discriminant function of a classifier that minimizes generalization error
over a hypothesis class has a corresponding payment rule that minimizes expected ex post
regret among all payment rules corresponding to classifiers in this class. Conveniently,
an appropriate method exists for multi-class classification with large outcome spaces that
supports the specific structure of the discriminant function, namely the method of structural
support vector machines [24, 12]. Just like standard support vector machines, it allows us
to adopt non-linear kernels, thus enabling price functions that depend in a non-linear way
on the outcome and on the reported types of other agents.
In illustrating the framework, we focus on two situations where strategyproof payment
rules are not available: a greedy outcome rule for a multi-minded combinatorial auction in
which each agent is interested in a constant number of bundles, and an assignment problem
with an egalitarian outcome rule, i.e., an outcome rule that maximizes the minimum value
of any agent. The experimental results we obtain are encouraging, in that they demonstrate
low expected ex post regret even when the 0/1 classification accuracy is only moderately
good, and in particular better regret properties than those obtained through simple VCG-
based payment rules that we adopt as a baseline. In addition, we give special consideration
to the failure of ex post individual rationality, and introduce methods to bias the classifier
to avoid these kinds of errors as well as post hoc adjustments that eliminate them. As
far as scalability is concerned, we emphasize that the computational cost associated with
our approach occurs offline during training. The learned payment rules have a succinct
description and can be evaluated quickly in a deployed mechanism.
Related Work
Conitzer and Sandholm [6] introduced the agenda of automated mechanism design (AMD),
which formulates mechanism design as an optimization problem. The output is the de-
scription of a mechanism, i.e., an explicit mapping from types to outcomes and payments.
4A discriminant function can be thought of as a way to distinguish between different outcomes for the
purpose of making a prediction.
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AMD is intractable in general, as the type space can be exponential in both the number of
agents and the number of items, but progress has recently been made in finding approxi-
mate solutions for domains with additive value structure and symmetry assumptions, and
adopting Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility (BIC) as the goal [4]. Another approach is
to search through a parameterized space of incentive-compatible mechanisms [9].
A parallel literature allows outcome rules to be represented by algorithms, like our
work, and thus extends to richer domains. Lavi and Swamy [15] employ LP relaxation to
obtain mechanisms satisfying BIC for set-packing problems, achieving worst-case approxi-
mation guarantees for combinatorial auctions. Hartline and Lucier [10] and Hartline et al.
[11] propose a general approach, applicable to both single-parameter and multi-parameter
domains, for converting any approximation algorithm into a mechanism satisfying BIC
that has essentially the same approximation factor with respect to social welfare. This
approach differs from ours in that it adopts BIC as a target rather than the minimization
of expected ex post regret. In addition, it evaluates the outcome rule on a number of
randomly perturbed replicas of the instance that is polynomial in the size of a discrete
type space, which is infeasible for combinatorial auctions where this size is exponential in
the number of items. The computational requirements of our trained rule are equivalent
to that of the original outcome rule.
Lahaie [13, 14] also adopts a kernel-based approach for combinatorial auctions, but
focuses not on learning a payment rule for a given outcome rule but rather on solving
the winner determination and pricing problem for a given instance of a combinatorial
auction. Lahaie introduces the use of kernel methods to compactly represent non-linear
price functions, which is also present in our work, but obtains incentive properties more
indirectly through a connection between regularization and price sensitivity.
2 Preliminaries
A mechanism design problem is given by a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of agents that interact to
select an element from a set Ω ⊆ "i∈NΩi of outcomes, where Ωi denotes the set of possible
outcomes for agent i ∈ N . Agent i ∈ N is associated with a type θi from a set Θi of
possible types, corresponding to the private information available to this agent. We write
θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) for a profile of types for the different agents, Θ = "i∈NΘi for the set of
possible type profiles, and θ−i ∈ Θ−i for a profile of types for all agents but i. Each agent
i ∈ N is further assumed to employ preferences over Ωi, represented by a valuation function
vi : Θi ×Ωi → R. We assume that for all i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi there exists an outcome o ∈ Ω
with vi(θi, oi) = 0.
A (direct) mechanism is a pair (g, p) of an outcome rule g : Θ→ "i∈NΩi and a payment
rule p : Θ→ Rn≥0. The intuition is that the agents reveal to the mechanism a type profile
θ ∈ Θ, possibly different from their true types, and the mechanism chooses outcome g(θ)
and charges each agent i a payment of pi(θ) = (p(θ))i. We assume quasi-linear preferences,
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so the utility of agent i with type θi ∈ Θi given a profile θ′ ∈ Θ of revealed types is
ui(θ
′, θi) = vi(θi, gi(θ′))− pi(θ′), where gi(θ) = (g(θ)i) denotes the outcome for agent i. A
crucial property of mechanism (g, p) is that its outcome rule is feasible, i.e., that g(θ) ∈ Ω
for all θ ∈ Θ.
Outcome rule g satisfies consumer sovereignty if for all i ∈ N , oi ∈ Ωi, and θ′−i ∈ Θ−i,
there exists θ′i ∈ Θi such that gi(θ′i, θ′−i) = oi; and reachability of the null outcome if for all
i ∈ N , θi ∈ Θi, and θ′−i ∈ Θ−i, there exists θ′i ∈ Θi such that vi(θi, gi(θ′i, θ′−i)) = 0.
Mechanism (g, p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible, or strategyproof, if each
agent maximizes its utility by reporting its true type, irrespective of the reports of the other
agents, i.e., if for all i ∈ N , θi ∈ Θi, and θ′ = (θ′i, θ′−i) ∈ Θ, ui((θi, θ′−i), θi) ≥ ui((θ′i, θ′−i), θi);
it satisfies individual rationality (IR) if agents reporting their true types are guaranteed
non-negative utility, i.e., if for all i ∈ N , θi ∈ Θi, and θ′−i ∈ Θ−i, ui((θi, θ′−i), θi) ≥ 0.
Observe that given reachability of the null outcome, strategyproofness implies individual
rationality.
It is known that a mechanism (g, p) is strategyproof if and only if the payment of an
agent is independent of its reported type and the chosen outcome simultaneously maximizes
the utility of all agents, i.e., if for every θ ∈ Θ,
pi(θ) = ti(θ−i, gi(θ)) for all i ∈ N, and (1)
gi(θ) ∈ arg max
o′i∈Ωi
(
vi(θi, o
′
i)− ti(θ−i, o′i)
)
for all i ∈ N, (2)
for a price function ti : Θ−i×Ωi → R. This simple characterization is crucial for the main
results in the present paper, providing the basis with which the discriminant function of a
classifier can be used to induce a payment rule.
In addition, a direct characterization of strategyproofness in terms of monotonicity
properties of outcome rules explains which outcome rules can be associated with a payment
rule in order to be “implementable” within a strategyproof mechanism [22, 1]. These
monotonicity properties provide a fundamental constraint on when our machine learning
framework can hope to identify a payment rule that provides full strategyproofness.
We quantify the degree of strategyproofness of a mechanism in terms of the regret
experienced by an agent when revealing its true type, i.e., the potential gain in utility by
revealing a different type instead. Formally, the ex post regret of agent i ∈ N in mechanism
(g, p), given true type θi ∈ Θi and reported types θ′−i ∈ Θ−i of the other agents, is
rgt i(θi, θ
′
−i) = max
θ′i∈Θi
ui
(
(θ′i, θ
′
−i), θi
)− ui((θi, θ′−i), θi).
Analogously, the ex post violation of individual rationality of agent i ∈ N in mechanism
(g, p), given true type θi ∈ Θi and reported types θ′−i ∈ Θ−i of the other agents, is
irv i(θi, θ
′
−i) = |min(ui((θi, θ′−i), θi), 0)|.
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We consider situations where types are drawn from a distribution with probability
density function D : Θ → R such that D(θ) ≥ 0 and ∫θ∈ΘD(θ) = 1. Given such a
distribution, and assuming that all agents report their true types, the expected ex post
regret of agent i ∈ N in mechanism (g, p) is Eθ∼D[rgt i(θi, θ−i)].
Outcome rule g is agent symmetric if for every permutation pi of N and all types
θ, θ′ ∈ Θ such that θi = θ′pi(i) for all i ∈ N , gi(θ) = gpi(i)(θ′) for all i ∈ N . Note that this
specifically requires that Θi = Θj and Ωi = Ωj for all i, j ∈ N . Similarly, type distribution
D is agent symmetric if D(θ) = D(θ′) for every permutation pi of N and all types θ, θ′ ∈ Θ
such that θi = θ
′
pi(i) for all i ∈ N . Given agent symmetry, a price function t1 : Θ−1×Ωi → R
for agent 1 can be used to generate the payment rule p for a mechanism (g, p), with
p(θ) =
(
t1(θ−1, g1(θ)), t1(θ−2, g2(θ)), . . . , t1(θ−n, gn(θ))
)
,
so that the expected ex post regret is the same for every agent.
We assume agent symmetry in the sequel, which precludes outcome rules that break
ties based on agent identity, but obviates the need to train a separate classifier for each
agent while also providing some benefits in terms of presentation. Because ties occur only
with negligible probability in our experimental framework, the experimental results are not
affected by this assumption.
3 Payment Rules from Multi-Class Classifiers
A multi-class classifier is a function h : X → Y , where X is an input domain and Y is a
discrete output domain. One could imagine, for example, a multi-class classifier that labels
a given image as that of a dog, a cat, or some other animal. In the context of mechanism
design, we will be interested in classifiers that take as input a type profile and output an
outcome. What distinguishes this from an outcome rule is that we will impose restrictions
on the form the classifier can take.
Classification typically assumes an underlying target function h∗ : X → Y , and the
goal is to learn a classifier h that minimizes disagreements with h∗ on a given input dis-
tribution D on X, based only on a finite set of training data {(x1, y1), . . . , (x`, y`)} =
{(x1, h∗(x1)), . . . , (x`, h∗(x`))} with x1, . . . , x` drawn from D. This may be challenging be-
cause the amount of training data is limited, or because h is restricted to some hypothesis
class H with a certain simple structure, e.g., linear threshold functions. If h(x) = h∗(x)
for all x ∈ X, we say that h is a perfect classifier for h∗.
We consider classifiers that are defined in terms of a discriminant function f : X×Y →
R, such that
h(x) ∈ arg max
y∈Y
f(x, y)
for all x ∈ X. More specifically, we will be concerned with linear discriminant functions of
the form
fw(x, y) = w
Tψ(x, y)
6
for a weight vector w ∈ Rm and a feature map ψ : X×Y → Rm, where m ∈ N∪{∞}.5 The
function ψ maps input and output into an m-dimensional space, which generally allows
non-linear features to be expressed.
3.1 Mechanism Design as Classification
Assume that we are given an outcome rule g and access to a distribution D over type
profiles, and want to design a corresponding payment rule p that gives the mechanism
(g, p) the best possible incentive properties. Assuming agent symmetry, we focus on a
partial outcome rule g1 : Θ→ Ω1 and train a classifier to predict the outcome to agent 1.
To train a classifier, we generate examples by drawing a type profile θ ∈ Θ from distribution
D and applying outcome rule g to obtain the target class g1(θ) ∈ Ω1.
We impose a special structure on the hypothesis class. A classifier hw : Θ → Ω1 is
admissible if it is defined in terms of a discriminant function fw of the form
fw(θ, o1) = w1v1(θ1, o1) + w
T
−1ψ(θ−1, o1)
for weights w such that w1 ∈ R>0 and w−1 ∈ Rm, and a feature map ψ : Θ−1 × Ω1 → Rm
for m ∈ N ∪ {∞}.
The first term of fw(θ, o1) only depends on the type of agent 1 and increases in its
valuation for outcome o1, while the remaining terms ignore θ1 entirely. This restriction
allows us to directly infer agent-independent prices from a trained classifier. For this, define
the associated price function of an admissible classifier hw as
tw(θ−1, o1) = − 1
w1
wT−1ψ(θ−1, o1),
where we again focus on agent 1 for concreteness. By agent symmetry, we obtain the
mechanism (g, pw) corresponding to classifier hw by letting
pw(θ) =
(
tw(θ−1, g1(θ)), tw(θ−2, g2(θ)), . . . , tw(θ−n, gn(θ))
)
.
Even with admissibility, appropriate choices for the feature map ψ will produce rich
families of classifiers, and thus ultimately useful payment rules. Moreover, this form is
compatible with structural support vector machines, discussed in Section 4.1.
3.2 Example: Single-Item Auction
Before proceeding further, we illustrate the ideas developed so far in the context of a
single-item auction. In a single-item auction, the type of each agent is a single number,
5We allow w to have infinite dimension, but require the inner product between w and ψ(x, y) to be
defined in any case. Computationally the infinite-dimensional case is handled through the kernel trick,
which is described in Section 4.1.1.
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corresponding to its value for the item being auctioned, and there are two possible alloca-
tions from the point of view of agent 1: one where it receives the item, and one where it
does not. Formally, Θ = Rn and Ω1 = {0, 1}.
Consider a setting with three agents and a training set
(θ1, o11) = ((1, 3, 5), 0), (θ
2, o21) = ((5, 4, 3), 1), (θ
3, o31) = ((2, 3, 4), 0),
and note that this training set is consistent with an optimal outcome rule, i.e., one that
assigns the item to an agent with maximum value. Our goal is to learn an admissible
classifier
hw(θ) = arg max
o1∈{0,1}
fw(θ, o1) = arg max
o1∈{0,1}
w1v1(θ1, o1) + w
T
−1ψ(θ−1, o1)
that performs well on the training set. Since there are only two possible outcomes, the
outcome chosen by hw is simply the one with the larger discriminant. A classifier that is
perfect on the training data must therefore satisfy the following constraints:
w1 · 0 + wT−1ψ((3, 5), 0) > w1 · 1 + wT−1ψ((3, 5), 1),
w1 · 5 + wT−1ψ((4, 3), 1) > w1 · 0 + wT−1ψ((4, 3), 0),
w1 · 0 + wT−1ψ((3, 4), 0) > w1 · 2 + wT−1ψ((3, 4), 1).
This can for example be achieved by setting w1 = 1 and
wT−1ψ((θ2, θ3), o1) =
{
−max(θ2, θ3) if o1 = 1 and
0 if o1 = 0.
(3)
Recalling our definition of the price function as tw(θ−1, o1) = −(1/w1)wT−1ψ(θ−1, o1),
we see that this choice of w and ψ corresponds to the second-price payment rule. We will
see in the next section that this relationship is not a coincidence.6
3.3 Perfect Classifiers and Implementable Outcome Rules
We now formally establish a connection between implementable outcome rules and perfect
classifiers.
Theorem 1. Let (g, p) be a strategyproof mechanism with an agent symmetric outcome
rule g, and let t1 be the corresponding price function. Then, a perfect admissible classifier
hw for partial outcome rule g1 exists if arg maxo1∈Ω1 (v1(θ1, o1)− t1(θ−1, o1))) is unique.
6In practice, we are limited in the machine learning framework to hypotheses that are linear in
ψ((θ2, θ3), o1), and will not be able to guarantee that (3) holds exactly. In Section 4.1.1 we will see, how-
ever, that certain choices of ψ allow for very complex hypotheses that can closely approximate arbitrary
functions.
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Proof. By the first characterization of strategyproof mechanisms, g must select an outcome
that maximizes the utility of agent 1 at the current prices, i.e.,
g1(θ) ∈ arg max
o1∈Ω1
(v1(θi, o1)− t1(θ−1, o1)).
Consider the admissible discriminant f(1,1)(θ, o1) = v1(θ1, o1)− t1(θ−1, o1), which uses the
price function t1 as its feature map. Clearly, the corresponding classifier h(1,1) maximizes
the same quantity as g1, and the two must agree if there is a unique maximizer.
The relationship also works in the opposite direction: a perfect, admissible classifier hw
for outcome rule g can be used to construct a payment rule that turns g into a strategyproof
mechanism.
Theorem 2. Let g be an agent symmetric outcome rule, hw : Θ → Ω1 an admissible
classifier, and pw the payment rule corresponding to hw. If hw is a perfect classifier for the
partial outcome rule g1, then the mechanism (g, pw) is strategyproof.
We prove this result by expressing the regret of an agent in mechanism (g, pw) in terms
of the discriminant function fw. Let Ωi(θ−i) ⊆ Ωi denote the set of partial outcomes for
agent i that can be obtained under g given reported types θ−i from all agents but i, keeping
the dependence on g silent for notational simplicity.
Lemma 1. Suppose that agent 1 has type θ1 and that the other agents report types θ−1.
Then the regret of agent 1 for bidding truthfully in mechanism (g, pw) is
1
w1
(
max
o1∈Ω(θ−1)
fw(θ, o1)− fw(θ, g1(θ))
)
.
Proof. We have
rgt1(θ) = max
θ′1∈Θ1
(
v1(θ1, g1(θ
′
1, θ−1))− pw,1(θ′1, θ−1)
)− (v1(θ1, g1(θ))− pw,1(θ))
= max
o1∈Ω1(θ−1)
(
v1(θ1, o1)− tw(θ−1, o1)
)− (v1(θ1, g1(θ))− tw(θ−1, g1(θ)))
= max
o1∈Ω1(θ−1)
(
v1(θ1, o1) +
1
w1
wT−1ψ(θ−1, o1)
)− (v1(θ1, g1(θ)) + 1
w1
wT−1ψ(θ−1, g1(θ))
)
=
1
w1
(
max
o1∈Ω1(θ−1)
fw(θ, o1)− fw(θ, g1(θ))
)
.
Proof of Theorem 2. If hw is a perfect classifier, then the discriminant function fw satis-
fies arg maxo1∈Ω1 fw(θ, o1) = g1(θ) for every θ ∈ Θ. Since g1(θ) ∈ Ω1(θ−1), we thus have
that maxo1∈Ω1(θ−1) fw(θ, o1) = fw(θ, g1(θ)). By Lemma 1, the regret of agent 1 for bid-
ding truthfully in mechanism (g, pw) is always zero, which means that the mechanism is
strategyproof.
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It bears emphasis that classifier hw is only used to derive the payment rule pw, while
the outcome is still selected according to g. In principle, classifier hw could be used to
obtain an agent symmetric outcome rule gw and, since hw is a perfect classifier for itself,
a strategyproof mechanism (gw, pw). Unfortunately, outcome rule gw is not in general
feasible. Mechanism (g, pw), on the other hand, is not strategyproof when hw fails to be
a perfect classifier for g. While payment rule pw always satisfies the agent-independence
property (1) required for strategyproofness, the “optimization” property (2) might be vi-
olated when hw(θ) 6= g1(θ).
3.4 Approximate Classification and Approximate Strategyproofness
A perfect admissible classifier for outcome rule g leads to a payment rule that turns g into
a strategyproof mechanism. We now show that this result extends gracefully to situations
where no such payment rule is available, by relating the expected ex post regret of a
mechanism (g, p) to a measure of the generalization error of a classifier for g.
Fix a feature map ψ, and denote by Hψ the space of all admissible classifiers with this
feature map. The discriminant loss of a classifier hw ∈ Hψ with respect to a type profile
θ and an outcome o1 ∈ Ω1 is given by
∆w(o1, θ) =
1
w1
(
fw(θ, hw(θ))− fw(θ, o1)
)
.
Intuitively the discriminant loss measures how far, in terms of the normalized discriminant,
hw is from predicting the correct outcome for type profile θ, assuming the correct outcome is
o1. Note that ∆(o1, θ) ≥ 0 for all o1 ∈ Ω1 and θ ∈ Θ, and ∆(o1, θ) = 0 if o1 = hw(θ). Note
further that hw(θ) = hw′(θ) does not imply that ∆w(o1, θ) = ∆w′(o1, θ) for all o1 ∈ Ω1:
even if two classifiers predict the same outcome, one of them may still be closer to predicting
the correct outcome o1.
The generalization error of classifier hw ∈ Hψ with respect to a type distribution D
and a partial outcome rule g1 : Θ→ Ω1 is then given by
Rw(D, g) =
∫
θ∈Θ
∆w
(
g1(θ), θ
)
D(θ)dθ.
The following result establishes a connection between the generalization error and the
expected ex post regret of the corresponding mechanism.
Theorem 3. Consider an outcome rule g, a space Hψ of admissible classifiers, and a
type distribution D. Let hw∗ ∈ Hψ be a classifier that minimizes generalization error with
respect to D and g among all classifiers in Hψ. Then the following holds:
1. If g satisfies consumer sovereignty, then (g, pw∗) minimizes expected ex post regret
with respect to D among all mechanisms (g, pw) corresponding to classifiers hw ∈ Hψ.
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2. Otherwise, (g, pw∗) minimizes an upper bound on expected ex post regret with respect
to D amongst all mechanisms (g, pw) corresponding to classifiers hw ∈ Hψ.
Proof. For the second property, observe that
∆w(g1(θ), θ) =
1
w1
(
fw(θ, hw(θ))− fw(θ, g1(θ))
)
=
1
w1
(
max
o1∈Ω1
fw(θ, o1)− fw(θ, g1(θ))
)
≥ 1
w1
(
max
o1∈Ω(θ−1)
fw(θ, o1)− fw(θ, g1(θ))
)
= rgt1(θ),
where the last equality holds by Lemma 1. If g satisfies consumer sovereignty, then the
inequality holds with equality, and the first property follows as well.
Minimization of expected regret itself, rather than an upper bound, can also be achieved
if the learner has access to the set Ω1(θ−1) for every θ−1 ∈ Θ−1.
4 A Solution using Structural Support Vector Machines
In this section we discuss the method of structural support vector machines (structural
SVMs) [24, 12], and show how it can be adapted for the purpose of learning classifiers with
admissible discriminant functions.
4.1 Structural SVMs
Given an input space X, a discrete output space Y , a target function h∗ : X → Y , and a
set of training examples {(x1, h∗(x1)), . . . , (x`, h∗(x`))} = {(x1, y1), . . . , (x`, y`)}, structural
SVMs learn a multi-class classifier h that on input x ∈ X selects an output y ∈ Y that
maximizes fw(x, y) = w
Tψ(x, y). For a given feature map ψ, the training problem is to
find a vector w for which hw has low generalization error.
Given examples {(x1, y1), . . . , (x`, y`)}, training is achieved by solving the following
convex optimization problem:
min
w,ξ≥0
1
2
wTw +
C
`
∑`
k=1
ξk (Training Problem 1)
s.t. wT
(
ψ(xk, yk)− ψ(xk, y)) ≥ L(yk, y)− ξk for all k = 1, . . . , `, y ∈ Y
ξk ≥ 0 for all k = 1, . . . , `.
The goal is to find a weight vector w and slack variables ξk such that the objective function
is minimized while satisfying the constraints. The learned weight vector w parameterizes
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the discriminant function fw, which in turn defines the classifier hw. The kth constraint
states that the value of the discriminant function on (xk, yk) should exceed the value of
the discriminant function on (xk, y) by at least L(yk, y), where L is a loss function that
penalizes misclassification, with L(y, y) = 0 and L(y, y′) ≥ 0 for all y, y′ ∈ Y . We generally
use a 0/1 loss function, but consider an alternative in Section 4.2.2 to improve ex post IR
properties. Positive values for the slack variables ξk allow the weight vector to violate some
of the constraints.
The other term in the objective, the squared norm of w, penalizes scaling of w. This is
necessary because scaling of w can arbitrarily increase the margin between fw(x
k, yk) and
fw(x
k, y) and make the constraints easier to satisfy. Smaller values of w, on the other hand,
increases the ability of the learned classifier to generalize by decreasing the propensity to
over-fit to the training data. Parameter C is therefore a regularization parameter: larger
values of C encourage small ξk and larger w, such that more points are classified correctly,
but with a smaller margin.
4.1.1 The Feature Map and the Kernel Trick
Given a feature map ψ, the feature vector ψ(x, y) for x ∈ X and y ∈ Y provides an alternate
representation of the input-output pair (x, y). It is useful to consider feature maps ψ for
which ψ(x, y) = φ(χ(x, y)), where χ : X ×Y → Rs for some s ∈ N is an attribute map that
combines x and y into a single attribute vector χ(x, y) compactly representing the pair,
and φ : Rs → Rm for m > s maps the attribute vector to a higher-dimensional space in
a non-linear way. In this way, SVMs can achieve non-linear classification in the original
space.
While we work hard to keep s small, the so-called kernel trick means that we do not have
the same problem with m: it turns out that in the dual of Training Problem 1, ψ(x, y) only
appears in an inner product of the form 〈ψ(x, y), ψ(x′, y′)〉, or, for a decomposable feature
map, 〈φ(z), φ(z′)〉 where z = χ(x, y) and z′ = χ(x′, y′). For computational tractability it
therefore suffices that this inner product can be computed efficiently, and the “trick” is to
choose φ such that 〈φ(z), φ(z′)〉 = K(z, z′) for a simple closed-form function K, known as
the kernel.
In this paper, we consider polynomial kernels Kpolyd , parameterized by d ∈ N+, and
radial basis function (RBF) kernels KRBF , parameterized by γ = 1/(2σ
2) for σ ∈ R+:
Kpolyd (z, z
′) = (z · z′)d,
KRBF (z, z
′) = exp
(−γ (‖z‖2 + ‖z′‖2 − 2z · z′)) .
Both polynomial and RBF kernels use the standard inner product of their arguments, so
their efficient computation requires that χ(x, y) · χ(x, y′) can be computed efficiently.
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4.1.2 Dealing with an Exponentially Large Output Space
Training Problem 1 has Ω(|Y |`) constraints, where Y is the output space and ` the number
of training instances, and enumerating all of them is computationally prohibitive when Y
is large. Joachims et al. [12] address this issue for structural SVMs through constraint
generation: starting from an empty set of constraints, this technique iteratively adds a
constraint that is maximally violated by the current solution until that violation is below
a desired threshold . Joachims et al. show that this will happen after no more than O(C )
iterations, each of which requires O(`) time and memory. However, this approach assumes
the existence of an efficient separation oracle, which given a weight vector w and an input
x finds an output y ∈ arg maxy∈Y fw(x, y). The existence of such an oracle remains an
open question in application to combinatorial auctions; see Section 5.1.3 for additional
discussion.
4.1.3 Required Information
In summary, the use of structural SVMs requires specification of the following:
1. The input space X, the discrete output space Y , and examples of input-output pairs.
2. An attribute map χ : X × Y → Rs. This function generates an attribute vector that
combines the input and output data into a single object.
3. A kernel function K(z, z′), typically chosen from a well-known set of candidates, e.g.,
polynomial or RBF. The kernel implicitly calculates the inner product 〈φ(z), φ(z′)〉,
e.g., between a mapping of the inputs into a high dimensional space.
4. If the space Y is prohibitively large, a routine that allows for efficient separation, i.e.,
a function that computes arg maxy∈Y fw(x, y) for a given w, x.
In addition, the user needs to stipulate particular training parameters, such as the regu-
larization parameter C, and the kernel parameter γ if the RBF kernel is being used.
4.2 Structural SVMs for Mechanism Design
We now specialize structural SVMs such that their learned discriminant function will mani-
fest as a payment rule for a given symmetric outcome function g and distribution D. In this
application, the input domain X is the space of type profiles Θ, and the output domain Y is
the space Ω1 of outcomes for agent 1. Thus we construct training data by sampling θ ∼ D
and applying g to these inputs: {(θ1, g1(θ1)), . . . , (θ`, g1(θ`))} = {(θ1, o11), . . . , (θ`, o`1)}. For
admissibility of the learned hypothesis hw(θ) = arg maxo1∈Ω1 wTψ(θ, o1), we require that
ψ(θ, o1) = (v1(θ1, o1), ψ
′(θ−1, o1))
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When learning payment rules, we therefore use an attribute map χ′ : Θ−1×Ω1 → Rs rather
than χ : Θ × Ω1 → Rs, and the kernel φ′ we specify will only be applied to the output of
χ′. This results in the following more specialized training problem:
min
w,ξ≥0
1
2
wTw +
C
`
∑`
k=1
ξk (Training Problem 2)
s.t. (w1v1(θ
k
1 , o
k
1) + w
T
−1ψ
′(θk−1, o
k
1))− (w1v1(θk1 , o1) + wT−1ψ′(θk−1, o1)) ≥ L(ok1, o1)− ξk
for all k = 1, . . . , `, o1 ∈ Ω1
ξk ≥ 0 for all k = 1, . . . , `.
If w1 > 0 then the weights w together with the feature map ψ
′ define a price function
tw(θ−1, o1) = −(1/w1)wT−1ψ′(θ−1, o1) that can be used to define payments pw(θ), as de-
scribed in Section 3.1. In this case, we can also relate the regret in the induced mechanism
(g, pw) to the classification error as described in Section 3.3.
Theorem 4. Consider training data {(θ1, o11), . . . , (θ`, o`1)}. Let g be an outcome function
such that g1(θ
k) = ok1 for all k. Let w, ξ
k be the weight vector and slack variables output
by Training Problem 2, with w1 > 0. Consider corresponding mechanism (g, pw). For each
θk,
rgt1(θ
k) ≤ 1
w1
ξk
Proof. Consider input θk. The constraints in the training problem impose that for every
outcome o1 ∈ Ω1,
w1v1(θ
k
1 , o
k
1) + w
T
−1ψ
′(θk−1, o
k
1)−
(
w1v1(θ
k
1 , o1) + w
T
−1ψ
′(θk−1, o1)
) ≥ L(ok1, o1)− ξk
Rearranging,
ξk ≥ L(ok1, o1) +
(
w1v1(θ
k
1 , o1) + w
T
−1ψ
′(θk−1, o1)
)− (w1v1(θk1 , ok1) + wT−1ψ′(θk−1, ok1))
⇒ ξk ≥ L(ok1, o1) + fw(θk, o1)− fw(θk, ok1)
This inequality holds for every o1 ∈ Ω1, so
ξk ≥ max
o1∈Ω1
(
L(ok1, o1) + fw(θk, o1)− fw(θk, ok1)
)
≥ max
o1∈Ω1
(
fw(θ
k, o1)− fw(θk, ok1)
)
≥ w1rgt1(θk)
where the second inequality holds because L(ok1, o1) ≥ 0, and the final inequality follows
from Lemma 1. This completes the proof.
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We choose not to enforce w1 > 0 explicitly in Training Problem 2, because adding this
constraint leads to a dual problem that references ψ′ outside of an inner product and thus
makes computation of all but linear or low-dimensional polynomial kernels prohibitively
expensive. Instead, in our experiments we simply discard hypotheses where the result of
training is w1 ≤ 0. This is sensible since the discriminant function value should increase
as an agent’s value increases, and negative values of w1 typically mean that the training
parameter C or the kernel parameter γ (if the RBF kernel is used) are poorly chosen. It
turns out that w1 is indeed positive most of the time, and for every experiment a majority
of the choices of C and γ yield positive w1 values. For this reason, we do not expect the
requirement that w1 > 0 to be a problem in practice.
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4.2.1 Payment Normalization
One issue with the framework as stated is that the payments pw computed from the solution
to Training Problem 2 could be negative.
We solved this problem by normalizing payments, using a baseline outcome ob: if there
exists an outcome o′ such that v1(θ1, o′) = 0 for every θ1, this “null outcome” is used as
the baseline; otherwise, we use the outcome with the lowest payment. Let tw(θ−1, o1) be
the price function corresponding to the solution w to Training Problem 2. Adopting the
baseline outcome, the normalized payments t′w(θ−1, o1) are defined as
t′w(θ−1, o1) = max(0, tw(θ−1, o1)− tw(θ−1, ob)).
Note that ob is only a function of θ−1, even when there is no null outcome, so t′w is still
only a function of θ−1 and o1.
4.2.2 Individual Rationality Violation
Even after normalization, the learned payment rule pw may not satisfy IR. We offer three
solutions to this problem, which can be used in combination.
Payment offsets One way to decrease the rate of IR violation is to add a payment offset,
which decreases all payments (for all type reports) by a given amount. We apply this
payment offset to all bundles other than ob; as with payment normalization, the adjusted
payment is set to 0 if it is negative.8 Note that payment offsets decrease IR violation, but
may increase regret. For instance, suppose there are only two outcomes o11, o12, where
o12 is the null outcome. Suppose agent 1 values o11 at 5 and receives the null outcome if
he reports truthfully. Suppose further that payments tw are 7 for o11 and 0 for the null
outcome. With no payment offset, the agent experiences no regret, since he receives utility
7For multi-minded combinatorial auctions, 1049/1080 > 97% of the trials had positive w1, for the
assignment problem all of the trials did; see Section 5 for details.
8It is again crucial that ob depends only on θ−1, so that the payment remains independent of θ1 given o1.
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0 from the null outcome, but negative utility from o11. However, if the payment offset
is greater than 2, the agent’s regret becomes positive (assuming consumer sovereignty)
because he could have reported differently and received o11 and received positive utility.
Adjusting the loss function L We incur an IR violation when there is a null outcome
onull such that g1(θ) 6= onull and fw(θ, onull ) > fw(θ, g1(θ)) for some type θ, assuming
truthful reports. This happens because fw(θ, o1) is a scaled version of the agent’s utility
for outcome o1 under payments pw. If the utility for the null outcome is greater than the
utility for g1(θ), then the payment tw(θ−1, g1(θ)) must be greater than v1(θ1, g1(θ)), causing
an IR violation. We can discourage these types of errors by modifying the constraints of
Training Problem 2: when ok1 6= onull and o1 = onull , we can increase L(ok1, o1) to heavily
penalize misclassifications of this type. With a larger L(ok1, o1), a larger ξk will be required if
fw(θ, o
k
1) < fw(θ, onull ). As with payment offsets, this technique will decrease IR violations
but is not guaranteed to eliminate all of them. In our experimental results, we refer to this
as the null loss fix, and the null loss refers to the value we choose for L(ok1, onull ) where
ok1 6= onull .
Deallocation In settings that have a null outcome and are downward closed (i.e., settings
where a feasible outcome o remains feasible if oi is replaced with the null outcome), we
modify the function g to allocate the null outcome whenever the price function tw creates
an IR violation. This reduces ex post regret and in particular ensures ex post IR. On
the other hand, the total value to the agents necessarily decreases under the modified
allocation. In our experimental results, we refer to this as the deallocation fix.
5 Applying the Framework
In this section, we discuss the application of our framework to two domains: multi-minded
combinatorial auctions and egalitarian welfare in the assignment problem.
5.1 Multi-Minded Combinatorial Auctions
A combinatorial auction allocates items {1, . . . , r} among n agents, such that each agent
receives a possibly empty subset of the items. The outcome space Ωi for agent i thus
is the set of all subsets of the r items, and the type of agent i can be represented by a
vector θi ∈ Θi = R2r that specifies its value for each possible bundle. The set of possible
type profiles is then Θ = R2rn, and the value vi(θi, oi) of agent i for bundle oi is equal to
the entry in θi corresponding to oi. We require that valuations are monotone, such that
vi(θi, oi) ≥ vi(θi, o′i) for all oi, o′i ∈ Ωi with o′i ⊆ oi, and normalized such that vi(θi, ∅) = 0.
Assuming agent symmetry and adopting the view of agent 1, the partial outcome rule
g1 : Θ → Ω1 specifies the bundle g1(θ) allocated to agent 1; we require feasibility, so that
no item is allocated more than once.
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In a multi-minded CA, each agent is interested in at most b bundles for some constant
b. The special case where b = 1 is called a single-minded CA. In our framework, the
restriction to multi-minded CAs leads to a number of computational advantages. First,
valuation profiles and thus the training data can be represented in a compact way, by
explicitly writing down the valuations for the constant number of bundles each agent is
interested in. Second, inner products between valuation profiles, which are required to
apply the kernel trick, can be computed in constant time.
5.1.1 Attribute Maps
To apply structural SVMs to multi-minded CAs, we need to specify an appropriate at-
tribute map χ. In our experiments we use two attribute maps χ1 : Θ−1×Ω1 → R2r(2r(n−1))
and χ2 : Θ−1 × Ω1 → R2r(n−1), which are defined as follows:
χ1(θ−1, o1) =

0
· · ·
0
θ−1
0
· · ·
0

 dec(o1)(2r(n− 1))
 (2r − dec(o1)− 1)(2r(n− 1))
, χ2(θ−1, o1) =

θ2 \ o1
θ3 \ o1
. . .
θn \ o1
 .
Here, dec(o1) =
∑r
j=1 2
j−1Ij∈o1 is a decimal index of bundle o1, where Ij∈o1 = 1 if j ∈ o1
and Ij∈o1 = 0 otherwise. Attribute map χ1 thus stacks the vector θ−1, which represents
the valuations of all agents except agent 1, with zero vectors of the same dimension, where
the position of θ−1 is determined by the index of bundle o1. The resulting attribute vector
is simple but potentially restrictive. It precludes two instances with different allocated
bundles from sharing attributes, which provides an obstacle to generalization of the dis-
criminant function across bundles. Attribute map χ2 stacks vectors θi \ o1, which are
obtained from θi by setting the entries for all bundles that intersect with o1 to 0. This
captures the fact that agent i cannot be allocated any of the bundles that intersect with
o1 if o1 is allocated to agent 1.
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5.1.2 Efficient Computation of Inner Products
Efficient computation of inner products is possible for both χ1, χ2. A full discussion can
be found in Appendix A.
9Both χ1 and χ2 are defined for a particular number of items and agents, and in our experiments we
train a different classifier for each number of agents and items. In practice, one can pad out items and
agents by setting bids to zero and train a single classifier.
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5.1.3 Dealing with an Exponentially Large Output Space
Recall that Training Problems 1 and 2 have constraints for every training example (θk, ok1)
and every possible bundle of items o1 ∈ Ω1, of which there are exponentially many in the
number of items in the case of CAs. In lieu of an efficient separation oracle, a workaround
exists when the discriminant function has additional structure, such that the induced pay-
ment weakly increases as items are added to a bundle. Given this item monotonicity, it
would suffice to include constraints for bundles that have a strictly larger value to the agent
than any of their respective subsets.
Still, it remains an open problem whether item monotonicity itself can be imposed on
the hypothesis class with a small number of constraints.10 An alternative is to optimistically
assume item monotonicity, only including the constraints associated with bundles that
are explicit in agent valuations. The baseline experimental results in Section 6 do not
assume item monotonicity and instead use a separation oracle that iterates over all possible
bundles o1 ∈ Ω1. We also present results which test the idea of optimistically assuming
item monotonicity, and while there is a degradation in performance, results are mostly
comparable.
5.2 The Assignment Problem
In the assignment problem, we are given a set of n agents and a set {1, . . . , n} of items,
and wish to assign each item to exactly one agent. The outcome space of agent i is thus
Ωi = {1, . . . , n}, and its type can be represented by a vector θi ∈ Θi = Rn. The set
of possible type profiles is then Θ = Rn2 . We consider an outcome rule that maximizes
egalitarian welfare in a lexicographic manner: first, the minimum value of any agent is
maximized; if more than one outcome achieves the minimum, the second lowest value is
maximized, and so forth. This outcome rule can be computed by solving a sequence of
integer programs. As before, we assume agent symmetry and adopt the view of agent 1.
To complete our specification of the structural SVM framework for this problem, we
need to define an attribute map χ3 : Rn
2−n×N→ Rs, where the first argument is the type
profile of all agents but agent 1, the second argument is the item assigned to agent 1, and s
is a dimension of our choosing. A natural choice for χ3 is to set
χ3(θ−1, j) = (θ2[−j], θ3[−j], . . . , θn[−j]) ∈ R(n−1)2 ,
10For polynomial kernels and certain attribute maps, a possible sufficient condition for item monotonicity
is to force the weights w−1 to be negative. However, as with the discussion of enforcing w1 > 0 directly,
these weight constraints do not dualize conveniently and results in the dual formulation no longer operate
on inner products 〈ψ′(θ−1, o1), ψ′(θ′−1, o′1)〉. As a result, we would be forced to work in the primal, and incur
extra computational overhead that increases polynomially with the kernel degree d. We have performed
some preliminary experiments with polynomial kernels, but we have not looked into reformulating the
primal to enforce item monotonicity.
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where θi[−j] denotes the vector obtained from θi by removing the jth entry. The attribute
map thus reflects the agents’ values for all items except item j, capturing the fact that the
item assigned to agent 1 cannot be assigned to any other agent. Since the outcome space
is very small, we choose not to use a non-linear kernel on top of this attribute vector.
6 Experimental Evaluation
We perform a series of experiments to test our theoretical framework. To run our ex-
periments, we use the SVM struct package [12], which allows for the use of custom kernel
functions, attribute maps, and separation oracles.
6.1 Setup
We begin by briefly discussing our experimental methodology, performance metrics, and
optimizations used to speed up the experiments.
6.1.1 Methodology
For each of the settings we consider, we generate three data sets: a training set, a validation
set, and a test set. The training set is used as input to Training Problem 2, which in turn
yields classifiers hw and corresponding payment rules pw. For each choice of the parameter
C of Training Problem 2, and the parameter γ if the RBF kernel is used, a classifier hw is
learned based on the training set and evaluated based on the validation set. The classifier
with the highest accuracy on the validation set is then chosen and evaluated on the test set.
During training, we take the perspective of agent 1, so a training set size of ` means that
we train an SVM on ` examples. Once a partial outcome rule has been learned, however,
it can be used to infer payments for all agents. We exploit this fact during testing, and
report performance metrics across all agents for a given instance in the test set.
6.1.2 Metrics
We employ three metrics to measure the performance of the learned classifiers. These
metrics are computed over the test set {(θk, ok)}`k=1.
Classification accuracy Classification accuracy measures the accuracy of the trained
classifier in predicting the outcome. Each instance of the ` instances has n agents, so in
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total we measure accuracy over n` instances:11
accuracy = 100 ·
∑`
k=1
∑n
i=1 I(hw(θi, θ−i) = o
k
i ))
n`
.
Ex post regret We measure ex post regret by summing over the ex post regret experi-
enced by all agents in each of the ` instances in the dataset, i.e.,
regret =
∑`
k=1
∑n
i=1 rgt i(θ
k
i , θ
k
−i)
n`
.
Individual rationality violation This metric measures the fraction of individual ra-
tionality violation across all agents:
ir-violation =
∑`
k=1
∑n
i=1 I(irv i(θi, θ−i) > 0)
n`
.
6.1.3 Optimizations
In the case of multi-minded CAs we map the inputs θ−1 into a smaller space, which
allows us to learn more effectively with smaller amounts of data.12 We use instance-based
normalization, which normalizes the values in θ−1 by the highest observed value and then
rescales the computed payment appropriately, and sorting, which orders agents based on
bid values.
Instance-Based Normalization The first technique we use is instance-based normal-
ization. Before passing examples θ to the learning algorithm or learned classifier, they are
normalized by a positive multiplier so that the value of the highest bid by agents other
than agent 1 is exactly 1, before passing it to the learning algorithm or classifier. The
values and the solution are then transformed back to the original scale before computing
the payment rule pw. This technique leverages the observation that agent 1’s allocation
depends on the relative values of the other agent’s reports (scaling all reports by a factor
should not affect the outcome chosen).
11For a given instance θ, there are actually many ways to choose (θi, θ−i) depending on the ordering of
all agents but agent i. We discuss a technique we refer to as sorting in Section 6.1.3, which will choose a
particular ordering. When this technique is not used, for example in our experiments for the assignment
problem, we simply fix an ordering of the other agents for each agent i and use the same ordering across
all instances.
12The barrier to using more data is not the availability of the data itself, but the time required for training,
because training time scales quadratically in the size of the training set due to the use of non-linear kernels.
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Sorting The second technique we use is sorting. With sorting, instead of choosing an
arbitrary ordering of agents in θ−i, we choose a specific ordering based on the maximum
value the agent reports. In the single-item setting, this amounts to ordering agents by their
value. In the multi-minded CA setting, agents are ordered by the value they report for
their most desired bundle. The intuition behind sorting is that we can again decrease the
space of possible θ−i reports the learner sees and learn more quickly. In the single-item
case, we know that the second price payment rule only depends on the maximum value
across all other agents, and sorting places this value in the first coordinate of θ−i.
6.2 Single-Item Auction
As a sanity check, we perform experiments on the single-item auction with the optimal
outcome rule, where the agent with the highest bid receives the item. In the single-
item case, we run experiments where D is the distribution where agent values are drawn
independently and uniformly from [0, 1]. The outcome rule g we use is the value-maximizing
rule, i.e., the agent with the highest value receives the item. We use a training set size of
300 and validation and test set sizes of 1000. In this case, we know that the associated
payment function that makes (g, p) strategyproof is the second price payment rule.
The results reported in Table 1 and Figure 1 are for the χ1, χ2 attribute maps, which
can be applied to this setting by observing that single-item auctions are a special case of
multi-minded CAs. In particular, letting z be the 0 vector of dimension n−1, χ1(θ−1, o1) =
(θ−1, z) if o1 = ∅ and χ1(θ−1, o1) = (z, θ−1) if o1 = {1} and χ2(θ−1, o1) = θ−1 if o1 = ∅ and
χ2(θ−1, o1) = z if o1 = {1}.
For both choices of the attribute map we obtain excellent accuracy and very close
approximation to the second-price payment rule. This shows that the framework is able
to automatically learn the payment rule of Vickrey’s auction.
n
accuracy regret ir-violation
χ1 χ2 χ1 χ2 χ1 χ2
2 99.7 93.1 0.000 0.003 0.00 0.07
3 98.7 97.6 0.000 0.000 0.01 0.00
4 98.4 99.1 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.01
5 97.3 96.6 0.001 0.001 0.02 0.00
6 97.6 97.4 0.000 0.001 0.00 0.02
Table 1: Performance metrics for single-item auction.
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Figure 1: Learned payment rule vs. second-price payment rule for single-item auction with
2 agents, for χ1 (left) and χ2 (right).
6.3 Multi-Minded CAs
6.3.1 Type Distribution
Recall that in a multi-minded setting, there are r items, and each agent is interested in
exactly b bundles. For each bundle, we use the following procedure (inspired by Sandholm’s
decay distribution for the single-minded setting [23]) to determine which items are included
in the bundle. We first assign an item to the bundle uniformly at random. Then with
probability α, we add another random item (chosen uniformly from the remaining items),
and with probability (1 − α) we stop. We continue this procedure until we stop or have
exhausted the items. We use α = 0.75 to be consistent with [23], as they report that the
winner determination problem (finding the feasible allocation that maximizes total value)
is difficult for this setting of α.
Once the bundle identities have been determined, we sample values for these bundles.
Let c be an r-dimensional vector with entries chosen uniformly from (0, 1]. For each agent i,
let di be an r-dimensional vector with entries chosen uniformly from (0, 1]. Each entry of
c denotes the common value of a specific item, while each entry of di denotes the private
value of a specific item for agent i. The value of bundle Sij is then given by
vij = min
Sij′≤Sij
(〈Sij′ , βc + (1− β)di〉
r
)ζ
for parameters β ∈ [0, 1] and ζ. The inner product in the numerator corresponds to a
sum over values of items, where common and private values for each item are respectively
weighted with β and (1 − β). The denominator normalizes all valuations to the interval
(0, 1]. Parameter ζ controls the degree of complementarity among items: ζ > 1 implies
that goods are complements, whereas ζ < 1 means that goods are substitutes. Choosing
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the minimum over bundles Sij′ contained in Sij finally ensures that the resulting valuations
are monotonic.
6.3.2 Outcome Rules
We use two outcome rules in our experiments. For the optimal outcome rule, the payment
rule pvcg makes the mechanism (gopt, pvcg) strategyproof. Under this payment rule, agent
i pays the externality it imposes on other agents. That is,
pvcg,1(θ) =
max
o∈Ω
∑
i 6=1
vi(θi, oi)
−∑
i 6=1
vi(θi, gi(θ)).
The second outcome rule with which we experiment is a generalization of the greedy
outcome rule for single-minded CA Lehmann et al. [16]. Our generalization of the greedy
rule is as follows. Let θ be the agent valuations and oi(j) denote the j-th bundle desired by
agent i. For each bundle oi(j), assign a score vi(θi, oi(j))/
√|oi(j)|, where |oi(j)| indicates
the total items in bundle oi(j). The greedy outcome rule orders the desired bundles by
this score, and takes the bundle oi(j) with the next highest score as long as agent i has not
already been allocated a bundle and oi(j) does not contain any items already allocated.
While this greedy outcome rule has an associated payment rule that makes it strategyproof
in the single-minded case, it is not implementable in the multi-minded case as the example
in Appendix B shows.
6.3.3 Description of Experiments
We experiment with training sets of sizes 100, 300, and 500, and validation and test sets
of size 1000. All experiments we report on are for a setting with 5 agents, 5 items, and 3
bundles per agent, and use β = 0.5, the RBF kernel, and parameters C ∈ {104, 105} and
γ ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1}.
6.3.4 Basic Results
Table 2 presents the basic results for multi-minded CAs with optimal and greedy outcome
rules, respectively. For both outcome rules, we present the results for pvcg as a baseline.
Because pvcg is the strategyproof payment rule for the optimal outcome rule, pvcg always
has accuracy 100, regret 0, and IR violation 0 for the optimal outcome rule.
Across all instances, as expected, accuracy is negatively correlated with regret and ex
post IR violation. The degree of complementarity between items, ζ, as well as the outcome
rule chosen, has a major effect on the results. Instances with low complementarity (ζ = 0.5)
yield payment rules with higher regret, and χ1 performs better on the greedy outcome
rule while χ2 performs better on the optimal outcome rule. For high complementarity
between items the greedy outcome tends to allocate all items to a single agent, and the
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Optimal outcome rule Greedy outcome rule
accuracy regret ir-violation accuracy regret ir-violation
n ζ pvcg χ1 χ2 pvcg χ1 χ2 pvcg χ1 χ2 pvcg χ1 χ2 pvcg χ1 χ2 pvcg χ1 χ2
2 0.5 100 70.7 91.9 0 0.014 0.002 0.0 0.06 0.03 50.9 59.1 40.6 0.079 0.030 0.172 0.22 0.12 0.33
3 0.5 100 54.5 75.4 0 0.037 0.017 0.0 0.19 0.10 55.4 57.9 54.7 0.070 0.030 0.088 0.18 0.21 0.36
4 0.5 100 53.8 67.7 0 0.042 0.031 0.0 0.22 0.18 61.1 58.2 57.9 0.056 0.033 0.056 0.14 0.20 0.31
5 0.5 100 15.8 67.0 0 0.133 0.032 0.0 0.26 0.19 64.9 61.3 63.0 0.048 0.027 0.042 0.13 0.19 0.24
6 0.5 100 61.1 68.2 0 0.037 0.032 0.0 0.22 0.20 66.6 63.8 63.8 0.041 0.034 0.045 0.12 0.20 0.24
2 1.0 100 84.5 93.4 0 0.008 0.001 0.0 0.08 0.02 87.8 86.6 84.0 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.04 0.06 0.09
3 1.0 100 77.1 83.5 0 0.012 0.005 0.0 0.13 0.09 85.3 86.7 85.7 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.04 0.07 0.05
4 1.0 100 74.6 81.1 0 0.014 0.009 0.0 0.16 0.12 82.4 86.5 84.2 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.05 0.08 0.08
5 1.0 100 73.4 77.4 0 0.018 0.011 0.0 0.19 0.12 82.7 85.8 84.9 0.007 0.009 0.009 0.04 0.10 0.10
6 1.0 100 75.0 77.7 0 0.020 0.013 0.0 0.20 0.16 80.0 87.4 88.1 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.04 0.08 0.07
2 1.5 100 91.5 96.9 0 0.004 0.000 0.0 0.06 0.02 94.7 91.1 91.7 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.02 0.04 0.04
3 1.5 100 91.0 93.4 0 0.004 0.001 0.0 0.05 0.03 97.1 92.8 93.2 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.01 0.02 0.04
4 1.5 100 92.5 94.2 0 0.003 0.001 0.0 0.03 0.04 96.4 91.5 92.1 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.02 0.07 0.07
5 1.5 100 91.7 93.9 0 0.004 0.002 0.0 0.06 0.03 97.5 90.5 91.4 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.01 0.06 0.04
6 1.5 100 91.9 93.7 0 0.003 0.001 0.0 0.05 0.04 98.4 92.2 92.8 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.01 0.06 0.06
Table 2: Results for multi-minded CA with training set size 500.
learned price function sets high prices for small bundles to capture this property. For
low complementarity the allocation tends to be split and less predictable. Still, the best
classifiers achieve average ex post regret of less than 0.032 (for values normalized to [0,1])
even though the corresponding prediction accuracy can be as low as 67%. For the greedy
outcome rule, the performance of pvcg is comparable for ζ ∈ {1.0, 1.5} but worse than the
payment rule learned in our framework in the case of ζ = 0.5, where the greedy outcome
rule becomes less optimal.
6.3.5 Effect of Training Set Size
Table 3 charts performance as the training set size is varied for the greedy outcome rule.
While training data is readily available (we can simply sample from D and run the outcome
rule g), training time becomes prohibitive for larger training set sizes. Table 3 shows that
regret decreases with larger training sets, and for a training set size of 500, the best of χ1
and χ2 outperforms pvcg for ζ = 0.5 and is comparable to pvcg for ζ ∈ {1.0, 1.5}.
6.3.6 IR Fixes
Table 4 summarizes our results regarding the various fixes to IR violations, for the partic-
ularly challenging case of the greedy outcome rule and ζ = 0.5. The extent of IR violation
decreases with larger payment offset and null loss. Regret tends to move in the opposite
direction, but there are cases where IR violation and regret both decrease. The three
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n ζ
accuracy 100 300 500 regret 100 300 500
pvcg χ1 χ2 χ1 χ2 χ1 χ2 pvcg χ1 χ2 χ1 χ2 χ1 χ2
2 0.5 50.9 54.3 48.2 57.0 46.9 59.1 40.6 0.079 0.045 0.195 0.032 0.098 0.030 0.172
3 0.5 55.4 50.1 49.8 55.7 54.4 57.9 54.7 0.070 0.054 0.078 0.038 0.082 0.030 0.088
4 0.5 61.1 53.4 56.2 56.4 58.5 58.2 57.9 0.056 0.050 0.059 0.040 0.061 0.033 0.056
5 0.5 64.9 14.2 57.9 61.0 61.8 61.3 63.0 0.048 0.173 0.064 0.038 0.048 0.027 0.042
6 0.5 66.6 58.4 58.8 62.2 63.9 63.8 63.8 0.041 0.039 0.059 0.037 0.049 0.034 0.045
2 1.0 87.8 80.7 80.5 84.4 84.1 86.6 84.0 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.008
3 1.0 85.3 74.9 78.0 83.0 80.6 86.7 85.7 0.006 0.020 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.006 0.006
4 1.0 82.4 78.5 80.1 84.2 83.1 86.5 84.2 0.006 0.015 0.014 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.007
5 1.0 82.7 81.0 81.8 84.3 84.3 85.8 84.9 0.007 0.020 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009
6 1.0 80.0 81.8 83.7 87.6 88.3 87.4 88.1 0.006 0.062 0.018 0.008 0.005 0.007 0.005
2 1.5 94.7 83.3 88.1 89.3 89.8 91.1 91.7 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
3 1.5 97.1 86.9 87.6 90.3 91.5 92.8 93.2 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
4 1.5 96.4 88.4 90.7 89.3 90.8 91.5 92.1 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
5 1.5 97.5 87.2 88.5 91.4 90.5 90.5 91.4 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002
6 1.5 98.4 86.3 86.8 91.4 92.5 92.2 92.8 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
Table 3: Effect of training set size on accuracy of learned classifier. Multi-minded CA,
greedy outcome rule. Training set size is given in the column labels for χ1, χ2. pvcg does
not have a training set size.
payment
offset
accuracy regret ir-violation ir-fix-welfare-avg
0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.5 1.0 1.5
0 59.7 61.8 61.7 0.065 0.048 0.042 0.35 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.43 0.52
0.05 61.7 61.2 60.1 0.054 0.045 0.044 0.29 0.20 0.15 0.37 0.54 0.65
0.10 62.1 59.3 56.7 0.048 0.047 0.051 0.23 0.14 0.10 0.48 0.66 0.75
0.15 60.4 55.1 52.2 0.047 0.055 0.064 0.17 0.10 0.06 0.59 0.75 0.84
0.20 57.8 51.7 48.5 0.052 0.067 0.079 0.12 0.06 0.03 0.70 0.83 0.90
0.25 54.3 47.7 44.3 0.061 0.082 0.096 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.79 0.89 0.93
Table 4: Impact of payment offset and null loss fix for ζ = 0.5 and greedy outcome rule,
training set size 300. All results are for χ2, null loss values appear in the second row.
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Figure 2: Impact of payment offset and null loss fix for greedy outcome rule, training set
size 300.
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n ζ
accuracy regret ir-violation
χ2 χ2 (i-mon) χ2 χ2 (i-mon) χ2 χ2 (i-mon)
2 0.5 46.9 46.3 0.098 0.232 0.28 0.38
3 0.5 54.4 8.6 0.082 0.465 0.33 0.06
4 0.5 58.5 48.2 0.061 0.811 0.31 0.25
5 0.5 61.8 57.0 0.048 0.136 0.26 0.26
6 0.5 63.9 61.3 0.049 0.078 0.25 0.20
2 1.0 84.1 82.2 0.008 0.010 0.06 0.08
3 1.0 80.6 80.1 0.009 0.010 0.10 0.09
4 1.0 83.1 79.7 0.009 0.012 0.11 0.11
5 1.0 84.3 77.2 0.009 0.020 0.10 0.11
6 1.0 88.3 83.9 0.005 0.013 0.08 0.11
2 1.5 89.8 89.1 0.002 0.003 0.03 0.06
3 1.5 91.5 91.3 0.002 0.003 0.04 0.04
4 1.5 90.8 89.7 0.003 0.003 0.06 0.06
5 1.5 90.5 87.3 0.003 0.005 0.04 0.05
6 1.5 92.5 70.8 0.002 0.081 0.06 0.17
Table 5: Comparison of performance with and without optimistically assuming item mono-
tonicity. (i-mon) indicates a payment rule learned by optimistically assuming item mono-
tonicity. Greedy outcome rule. Training set size 300.
rightmost columns of Table 4 list the average ratio between welfare after and before the
deallocation fix, across the instances in the test set. With a payment offset of 0, a large
welfare hit is incurred if we deallocate agents with IR violations. However, this penalty
decreases with increasing payment offsets and increasing null loss. At the most extreme
payment offset and null loss adjustment, the IR violation is as low as 2%, and the deallo-
cation fix incurs a welfare loss of only 7%.
Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the impact of payment offsets and null
losses. Each line in the plot corresponds to a payment rule learned with a different null
loss, and each point on a line corresponds to a different payment offset. The payment
offset is zero for the top-most point on each line, and equal to 0.29 for the lowest point
on each line. Increasing the payment offset always decreases the rate of IR violation, but
may decrease or increase regret. Increasing null loss lowers the top-most point on a given
line, but arbitrarily increasing null loss can be harmful. Indeed, in the figure on the left, a
null loss of 1.5 results in a slightly higher top-most point but significantly lower regret at
this top-most point compared to a null loss of 2.0. It is also interesting to note that these
adjustments have much more impact on the hardest distribution with ζ = 0.5.
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n
accuracy regret ir-violation
vcg tot-vcg eg-vcg pw vcg tot-vcg eg-vcg pw vcg tot-vcg eg-vcg pw
2 64.3 67.5 67.5 89.0 0.018 0.015 0.015 0.023 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
3 48.0 52.1 42.5 77.9 0.070 0.077 0.127 0.041 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.04
4 40.6 43.1 30.8 71.0 0.111 0.123 0.199 0.054 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.02
5 32.4 35.3 24.5 63.9 0.157 0.169 0.254 0.071 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.01
6 27.1 29.9 20.0 59.0 0.189 0.208 0.290 0.074 0.10 0.13 0.03 0.01
Table 6: Results for assignment problem with egalitarian outcome rule
6.3.7 Item Monotonicity
Table 5 presents a comparison of a payment rule learned with explicit enumeration of all
bundle constraints (the default that we have been using for our other results) and a payment
rule learned by optimistically assuming item monotonicity (see Section 5.1.3). Performance
is affected when we drop constraints and optimistically assume item monotonicity, although
the effects are small for ζ ∈ {1.0, 1.5} and larger for ζ5 = 0.5. Because item monotonicity
allows for the training problem to be succinctly specified, we may be able to train on more
data, and this seems a very promising avenue for further consideration (perhaps coupled
with heuristic methods to add additional constraints to the training problem).
6.4 The Assignment Problem
In the assignment problem, agents’ values for the items are sampled uniformly and inde-
pendently from [0, 1]. We use a training set of size 600, validation and test sets of size
1000, and the RBF kernel with parameters C ∈ {10, 1000, 100000} and γ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 1.0}.
The performance of the learned payment rules is compared to that of three VCG-based
payment rules. Let W be the total welfare of all agents other than i under the outcome
chosen by g, and Weg be the minimum value any agent other than i receives under this
outcome. We then consider the following payment rules: (1) the vcg payment rule, where
agent i pays the difference between the maximum total welfare of the other agents under
any allocation and W ; (2) the tot-vcg payment rule, where agent i pays the difference
between the total welfare of the other agents under the allocation maximizing egalitarian
welfare and W ; and (3) the eg-vcg payment rule, where agent i pays the difference between
the minimum value of any agent under the allocation maximizing egalitarian welfare and
Weg.
The results for attribute map χ3 are shown in Table 6. We see that the learned payment
rule pw yields significantly lower regret than any of the VCG-based payment rules, and
average ex post regret less than 0.074 for values normalized to [0, 1]. Since we are not
maximizing the sum of values of the agents, it is not very surprising that VCG-based
payment rules perform rather poorly. The learned payment rule pw can adjust to the
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outcome rule, and also achieves a low fraction of ex post IR violation of at most 3%.
7 Conclusions
We have introduced a new paradigm for computational mechanism design in which statisti-
cal machine learning is adopted to design payment rules for given algorithmically specified
outcome rules, and have shown encouraging experimental results. Future directions of in-
terest include (1) an alternative formulation of the problem as a regression rather than
classification problem, (2) constraints on properties of the learned payment rule, concern-
ing for example the core or budgets, (3) methods that learn classifiers more likely to induce
feasible outcome rules, so that these learned outcome rules can be used, (4) optimistically
assuming item monotonicity and dropping constraints implied by it, thereby allowing for
better scaling of training time with training set size at the expense of optimizing against
a subset of the full constraints in the training problem, and (5) an investigation of the ex-
tent to which alternative goals such as regret percentiles or interim regret can be achieved
through machine learning.
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A Efficient Computation of Inner Products
For both χ1 and χ2, computing inner products reduces to the question of whether inner
products between valuation profiles are efficiently computable. For χ1, we have that
〈
χ1(θ−1, o1), χ1(θ′−1, o
′
1)
〉
= Io1=o′1
n∑
i=2
〈
θi, θ
′
i
〉
,
where indicator Io1=o′1 = 1 if o1 = o
′
1 and Io1=o′1 = 0 otherwise. For χ2,
〈
χ2(θ−1, o1), χ2(θ′−1, o
′
1)
〉
=
n∑
i=2
〈
θi \ o1, θ′i \ o1
〉
.
We next develop efficient methods for computing the inner products 〈θi, θ′i〉 on com-
pactly represented valuation functions. The computation of 〈θi \ o1, θ′i \ o1〉 can be done
through similar methods.
In the single-minded setting, let θi correspond to a bundle Si ⊆ {1, . . . , r} of items with
value vi, and θ
′
i correspond to a set S
′
i ⊆ {1, . . . , r} of items valued at v′i.
Each set containing both Si and S
′
i contributes viv
′
i to θ
T
i θ
′
i, while all other sets con-
tribute 0. Since there are exactly 2r−|Si∪S′i| sets containing both Si and S′i, we have
θTi θ
′
i = viv
′
i2
r−|Si∪S′i|.
This is a special case of the formula for the multi-minded case.
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Lemma 2. Consider a multi-minded CA and two bid vectors x1 and x
′
1 corresponding to
sets S = {S1, . . . , Ss} and S′ = {S′1, . . . , S′t}, with associated values v1, . . . , vs and v′1, . . . , v′t.
Then,
xT1 x
′
1 =
∑
T⊆S,T ′⊆S′
(
(−1)|T |+|T ′| · (min
Si∈T
vi) · ( min
S′j∈T ′
v′j) · 2
r−|(⋃Si∈T Si)∪(⋃S′j∈T ′ S′j)|). (4)
Proof. The contribution of a particular bundle B of items to the inner product is
(maxSi∈S,Si⊆B vi) · (maxS′j∈S′,S′j⊆B v′j), and thus
xT1 x
′
1 =
∑
B
(
(max
Si∈S
Si⊆B
vi) · (max
S′
j
∈S′
S′
j
⊆B
v′j)
)
.
By the maximum-minimums identity, which asserts that for any set {x1, . . . , xn} of n
numbers, max{x1, . . . , xn} =
∑
Z⊆X((−1)|Z|+1 · (minxi∈Z xi)),
max
Si∈S
Si⊆B
vi =
∑
T⊆S⋃
Si∈T Si⊆B
(
(−1)|T |+1 · (min
Si∈T
vi)
)
and
max
S′
j
∈S′
S′
j
⊆B
v′j =
∑
T ′⊆S′⋃
S′
j
∈T ′ S
′
j⊆B
(
(−1)|T ′|+1 · ( min
S′j∈T ′
v′j)
)
.
The inner product can thus be written as
θT1 θ
′
1 =
∑
B
∑
T⊆S,T ′⊆S′⋃
Si∈T Si⊆B⋃
S′
j
∈T ′ S
′
j
⊆B
(
(−1)|T |+|T ′| · (min
Si∈T
vi) · ( min
S′j∈T ′
v′j)
)
.
Finally, for given T ⊆ S and T ′ ⊆ S′, there exist exactly 2r−|(
⋃
Si∈T Si)∪(
⋃
S′
j
∈T ′ S
′
j)| bundles
B such that
⋃
Si∈T Si ⊆ B and
⋃
S′j∈T ′ S
′
j ⊆ B, and we obtain
θT1 θ
′
1 =
∑
T⊆S,T ′⊆S′
(
(−1)|T |+|T ′| · (min
Si∈T
vi) · ( min
S′j∈T ′
v′j) · 2
m−|(⋃Si∈T Si)∪(⋃S′j∈T ′ S′j)|).
If S and S′ have constant size, then the sum on the right hand side of (4) ranges over
a constant number of sets and can be computed efficiently.
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B Greedy Allocation Rule is not Weakly Monotone
Consider a setting with a single agent and four items.
If the valuations θ1 of the agent are
v1(θ1, o1) =

20 if o1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
12 if 1 ∈ o1 and j /∈ o1 for some j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, and
0 else
then the allocation is {1}.
If the valuations are θ′1 such that
v1(θ
′
1, o1) =

12 if o1 = {1, 2, 3, 4}
5 if 1 ∈ o1 and j /∈ o1 for some j ∈ {2, 3, 4}, and
0 else
then the allocation is {1, 2, 3, 4}.
We have v1(θ
′
1, {1, 2, 3, 4})− v1(θ′1, {1}) < v1(θ1, {1, 2, 3, 4})− v1(θ1, {1}) contradicting
weak monotonicity.
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